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ABSTRACT 
This report examines the potential effect of the Marikana incident on the companies listed in 
the mining sector on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) for the defined observation 
period (3rd January 2012 to 23rd August 2012). Event study methodology was used to 
capture the market reaction to the incident. This entailed the determination of abnormal 
returns on the event date and cumulative abnormal returns for windows defined as 2 and 5 
days post the event date. The entire population of companies listed in the Mining sector on 
the JSE was used in order to capture the full consequence of the event. The results 
presented a contained effect, limited exclusively to Lonmin Plc. (‘Lonmin’), which exhibited 
significant abnormal returns on the event date but recovered in the subsequent days.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Purpose of study 
The purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between the Marikana incident1 
and the effect on the value of mining stocks listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE), by identifying and measuring abnormal returns over a defined event period. Given the 
significant attention paid to this event in local and international media, such a case has the 
potential to negatively affect the value of firms in the JSE’s mining sector.   
There are similar studies which have examined the effect of unusual events on share prices. 
Chen and Siems (2004), for example, quantify the impact of terrorist attacks on global stock 
indexes. Studies by Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010) and Hamilton (1995) quantify the 
impact of stock market reactions to news of companies causing environmental damage. 
More specifically, White (1996) examines the impact of the Exxon Valdes oil spill on stock 
prices; Kalra et al (1993) determine the impact of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster on utility 
share prices; and Hovav and D'Arcy (2003) examine the impact of ‘denial of service’ (DOS) 
attack announcements on the affected firms’ stock prices. 
The above cases bear resemblance in that the market was unable to anticipate the event. 
The unpredicted nature of the Marikana incident drew significant media attention, both 
locally and internationally (Nkosi, 2012, Mabuse, 2012). Despite this, there has been no 
published academic research on the potential economic effect of Marikana. The purpose of 
this research is to consider the potential effect that the Marikana incident has had on the 
returns of mining companies listed on the JSE for a specified period, using share prices 
obtained from the JSE over a defined observation period comprised of an estimation and 
event window (see Appendix A for the timeline of the observation window). 
                                                     
1 Refers to the shooting of 34 miners by the South African Police Service on 16 August 2012 
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1.2 Context and significance of study 
The mining sector has traditionally been responsible for driving a significant amount of 
economic activity in South Africa (Twala, 2012). The sector contributed 8.8% directly, and 
10% indirectly, to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP); provided employment to 
approximately one million workers, and supplied approximately R10billion in corporate tax 
revenue in 2009 (Van der Schyff, 2012: 131). Given the size and importance of the industry, 
it is understandable that any event that directly impacts the sector (such as Marikana) can 
trigger a significant effect on the South African economy.  
There is currently, however, limited research available on the Marikana incident. Presently, 
most of the information available on Marikana comes from the popular press and deals with 
issues such as: the socio-political aspects of the incident, including labour relations (Twala, 
2012), the political ramifications (van Graan, 2013) and social aspects focusing on the 
evolution of protest action (Bond and Mottiar, 2013). Consequently, this paper makes an 
important contribution by providing an initial quantitative assessment of the potential 
economic consequence of the Marikana incident. 
1.3 Definition of terms 
Important terms used in this research report are:  
 Marikana incident – This refers to the shooting of 34 miners by the South African Police 
Service on 16 August 2012.  
 Estimation window – The period used to determine the normal level of returns. It is 
important this window is separate from the event window so as not to be influenced by 
returns around the event (Appendix A) (MacKinlay, 1997).  
 Event date – The specific date when the Marikana incident occurred – 16 August 2012 
(Appendix A) (MacKinlay, 1997). 
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 Normal returns – The expected return over the defined estimation window. The market 
model developed by MacKinlay (1997) will be used to determine the normal level of 
expected returns (Appendix A).  
 Event study methodology – This is defined as a statistical study performed on securities 
examining the impact that a catalysing event can have on the value of a firm (MacKinlay, 
1997). 
 Alpha – Defined as the measure of performance on a risk-adjusted basis. This can be 
further explained as the excess return of a security, experienced relative to that of a 
specified benchmark (Harvey and Sticht, 2014). 
 Beta –defined as the measure of systematic risk or volatility in relation to the market as a 
whole. This measure forms an intrinsic part of the measurement of expected returns in 
the CAPM model (Harvey and Sticht, 2014). 
 Abnormal returns: The excess of returns over the expected normal returns (MacKinlay, 
1997). It is the term used to describe how the returns generated by a security over a 
period of time differ from the expected returns (Harvey and Sticht, 2014). 
1.4 Limitations and delimitations of this study 
This paper excludes: 
 Companies not listed on the JSE because of the lack of readily available data. 
 Companies listed on foreign stock exchanges. The economic effect of this event will 
be examined in a South African context, given the locality of the event.   
 Companies not listed as part of the Mining Index on the JSE. Since this index will 
experience the direct impact of the incident, this study will isolate the population to 
include only mining companies listed on the JSE Mining Index.  
 To retain focus on the effect of Marikana on stock prices, the impact of the incident 
on other variables such as: commodity prices, gross-domestic product (GDP), and 
tax revenues is not dealt with. Due to difficulties in objectively estimating social and 
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political costs, this is excluded from the study. Consequently, changes in returns 
cannot provide a total account of the loss of value.  
 The research will not carry out an econometric evaluation designed to separate the 
movement in share prices into multiple determinants. Consequently, the research 
does not claim to test for or prove causal relationships between share prices, returns 
and the Marikana incident. There is also the tacit assumption, due to the use of a 
relatively short observation period (Kothari and Warner, 2006), that the Marikana 
incident is the only material determinant of share prices for the period under review. 
This mimics the assumptions of other similar studies (Chen and Siems, 2004, White, 
1996, Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2010) which test share price reactions to a 
single unpredicted event. Since the study will use a short event-window there will be 
no need for cross sectional variance adjustments as recommended by Corrado 
(2011) for studies with longer event windows. 
 As this study is testing the effect of the Marikana incident (as an unusual event) on 
normal and abnormal returns only, the effect of preceding strike action, which formed 
part of normal labour negotiations, is not examined. Given industrial action is a 
common feature in the mining industry (McClenaghan, 2012), this study will aim to 
assess the potential effect of the deaths of the mine workers (the unforeseen single 
event) rather than the strike itself. That these proceeding events may have had an 
impact on returns which continued after the Marikana incident is possible but not 
here examined further.  
 This study will not apply quadratic or multifactor models to the observation data since 
the gains from applying such models are limited in comparison to the more direct  
market model approach (MacKinlay, 1997) (see Section 3.1 for further details).  
 This report aims to assess the market’s reaction as a whole to the Marikana event 
and does not attempt to profile specific investors and their reaction. 
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 This study will not analyse the impact of the other specifications, such as size of the 
tested corporations, since this report is testing the effect of the event across all firms 
listed in the specific mining sector. 
1.5 Assumptions 
The following assumptions have been made in respect of the research process: 
 The date of the first media publications will be the most accurate reflection of when 
the market became acutely aware of the event, in terms of the semi-efficient market 
hypothesis theory (Malkiel and Fama, 1970). 
 The data collected from the JSE is accurate and complete. The market processes 
information about the event in an efficient and unbiased manner. The JSE operates 
at a semi-strong form market efficiency level. (Choudhry, 1999, Magnusson and 
Wydick, 2002, Jefferis et al, 1999, Glass and Smit, 1995).  
 The volume of trade on the day of the event and during the corresponding event 
window will be sufficient to reflect the information content in the share prices as the 
media reports become accessible to the public (Blume et al, 1994). The use of the 
rank test (Corrado, 1989) and sign test (Cowan, 1992) help to alleviate the problem 
of thin trading since, being non-parametric tests, both tests do not depend on the 
assumption of normal distribution (Cowan and Sergeant, 1996). This study will apply 
both the sign and rank tests as part of the tests of robustness. Nevertheless, this 
study will not be able to prove a causal relationship between the event under review 
and share prices (Section 1.4). 
 Share prices reflect all available market information and the volatility is a correct 
measure of the markets response to the information (Fama et al, McWilliam and 
Siegal 1997) and, therefore, abnormal returns capture the effect of the Marikana 
incident (MacKinlay, 1997). 
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 Share volatility is a measure of the market response and reflects the information 
contained in the share prices in an efficient and unbiased manner (Fama et al, 1969). 
 The data collected from the BFA McGregor database regarding the JSE share prices 
is accurate and complete. 
 The Marikana incident can be considered an unforeseen event from a market 
perspective (Nkosi, 2012, Mabuse, 2012). The abnormal returns will, therefore, 
reflect this unanticipated market response (Fama, 1965b). 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 The efficient market hypothesis 
2.1.1 Background 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is an economic theory developed by Fama et al 
(1969) asserting that financial markets will process information efficiently. The term ‘efficient 
markets was first conceived by Fama (1965a), who later defined it as: 
‘a market where there are large numbers of rational, profit-maximizers actively 
competing with each trying to predict the future market values of individual 
securities, and where important current information is almost freely available to all 
participants. In an efficient market, competition among the many intelligent 
participants leads to a situation where, at any point in time, actual prices of 
individual securities already reflect the effects of information based both on 
events that have already occurred and on events which, as of now, the market 
expects to take place in the future’ (Fama, 1965b, p.56).  
Brown (2009) deconstructs the above definition and simplifies it into three separate 
assumptions: there must be multiple market participants who analyse and value stocks 
independently from each other, new information (that could not be predicted) is brought into 
the market at random, and, lastly, stock prices will react quickly to this new information as 
profit maximizers discount this information into the stock prices. 
Malkiel and Fama (1970) acknowledge that ‘a frictionless market’ in which all information is 
freely available and investors agree on its implications is not descriptive of markets in 
practice but this does suggest that the above conditions ‘exist to some extent in real world 
markets’ (Malkiel and Fama, 1970, p. 387-388). The EMH has, therefore, formed a popular 
basis for multiple finance studies (MacKinlay, 1997).  
14 
 
The EMH requires that each economic agent demonstrate a behavioural response to this 
information that will maximize returns (Fama, 1965a). In theory, this model is based on the 
assumption that shareholders have rational expectations about the future and this kind of 
expectation is identical to the optimal forecast of future events assuming all available 
information has been taken into account (Muth, 1961).  
The EHM theorem dictates that, whenever new information is made available to the users, 
their assumptions are updated immediately and they will react accordingly (Fama et al, 
1969). It is important to note that it is not necessary for an investor to react rationally to this 
market news - that is to say that either an over-or under-reaction will take place. The EMH 
only requires that the market’s reaction follows a normal distribution pattern so that any one 
person can be wrong about the market but the overall market will be right (Fama et al, 1969). 
The EMH, based on  investors’ responses, suggests that all relevant information to share-
value has been incorporated into the share price (Brown, 2009). Principally, should new 
information come to light (i.e. from an unforeseen event), it will be immediately  taken into 
account in a firm’s share price as investors reassess the respective entity’s current and 
future prospects. The new share price will reflect an investor’s assessment of the discounted 
value of a firm’s current and future performance. The strength of the information content of 
the share price will depend on the overall assessment of many investors and their ability to 
process and assimilate this information into the market prices of the firms (Schwert, 1981). 
The scope of the share price to reflect fully all available information will be subject to how 
efficiently the market can absorb it (Malkiel and Fama, 1970).  
2.1.2 Market forms 
How efficiently the market responds to this new information will depend on the form of the 
market (Malkiel and Fama, 1970). The three common market forms derived from the EMH 
model are weak-form efficiency, semi-strong form efficiency and strong-form efficiency which 
are differentiated by levels of information reflected in share prices (Brealey et al, 2008).  
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In weak form efficiency markets, share prices are a reflection of past information only and 
cannot be used as a forecast basis to predict future prices (Malkiel and Fama, 1970). This 
implies that future price movements are determined by information that is independent of 
that already discounted into the share price and thus share price will exhibit no patterns. In 
other words, any movements in the share price will occur at random. Past information will, 
therefore, provide no signalling to investors to forecast future returns since they would have 
already learnt to interpret and take advantage of this information (Bodie et al, 2010).  
The semi-strong form efficiency theory is critical to this study as this market model suggests 
that share prices will immediately react to information as it becomes available to the public 
(Malkiel and Fama, 1970). Additionally, the market will react in an unbiased fashion and the 
information will be included in the value of the share thus no additional gains may be made 
from trading on that information. In order to determine whether a strong-form efficient market 
exists, it is necessary to examine the impact of news that was previously unknown in terms 
of magnitude, direction and the speed at which the market assimilates this information. A 
perfectly semi-strong form efficient market will absorb publically available information 
instantaneously. For a semi-strong market to remain efficient, well trained analysts who 
understand economic powers are required, since it is not only necessary to act on financial 
information but also to comprehend the market impact of processing this information (Clarke 
et al, 2001).  
In strong-form efficient markets, share prices will reflect all public and private information, 
meaning that it will be impossible to earn additional returns from access to this information 
(Malkiel and Fama, 1970). A test for strong-form efficient markets would be to observe 
whether an investor is consistently able to beat the market in the long-term. If this is the case 
then, the market is not an efficient market since it means that information may not be 
available to every investor, which would result in arbitrage. This assumption is disputed by 
Seyhun (1986), (1998) who provides empirical evidence that insider traders’ profit from 
information is not already incorporated into a share price. 
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Concerns have been expressed regarding some of the assumptions inherent in the EMH 
theory. There are three main misconceptions borne out of the EMH theory, namely that: 
investors cannot outperform the market, financial analysis research is ineffective since all 
information is already available, and investors who evaluate information must be informed 
and skilled (Clarke et al, 2001). Much research has been conducted regarding the above 
concerns, notably the report by Basu (1977). 
Basu (1977), a sceptic about the EMH, criticised the model, based on the fact that low-price-
to earnings stocks tended to outperform other stocks. Simply, he argues, share prices are 
biased and price-to-earnings ratios are an indicator of this bias since they have reliable 
forecast power (something that should not exist in an efficient market).  
Despite these noted imperfections, the EMH is widely considered to be a reasonable basis 
for describing changes in share prices (Malkiel, 2003). 
2.1.3 South African context 
Numerous studies have examined the efficiency of African markets, and, as a sub-category, 
the JSE. Magnusson and Wydick (2002) find that the JSE does not have the same level of 
efficiency as the NYSE but fares well when compared to the Asian and South American 
countries. Jefferis and Smith (2004) examine the changing efficiency of African markets and 
specifically cite the study by Jefferis et al (1999) as a test of how efficiently the stock markets 
of South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe respond to new information in terms of speed and 
price adjustments. The study found that the JSE is semi-strong form efficient (Jefferis and 
Smith, 2004). Glass and Smit (1995)  tested whether the JSE demonstrated factors of a 
strong-form efficiency market and found that, although there were slight opportunities for 
exploiting market inefficiencies, the market did not fully conform to strong-form efficiency. 
Nevertheless, he concluded that the market was at least semi-strong form efficient.  
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The market’s ability to respond efficiently to publically available information (e.g. the 
Marikana incident) is crucial to the successful implementation of event study methodology 
(Schwert, 1981). 
2.2 The Marikana incident 
The Marikana incident is considered a significant event in South African history with parallels 
drawn between the Marikana shootings and the Sharpeville and Soweto uprisings of 1960 
and 1976 respectively (Sorensen, 2012). The event attracted significant attention from local 
and international media due to the number of casualties, as well as the historical sensitivity 
associated with the South African Police Service’s (SAPS) use of force (Marinovich, 2012). 
This also evoked a response from the investor community with many implying that this was 
evidence that the South African mining industry is in decline (Cawadas and Mitchell, 2012).  
The Marikana incident was the climax of an unprecedented year of strike action in the South 
African mining industry which witnessed the highest number of protests per month since the 
end of Apartheid (McClenaghan, 2012). Unrest in the mining sector was first started by Rock 
Drill Operators (RDO’s) at the Impala Platinum mine in January 2012 (Chinguno, 2013). The 
mandate from the RDO’s was a wage increase of 200% due to a decision made by 
management to award mine blasters an 18% increase in retention allowance. The RDO’s 
particularly wanted prevent the involvement of their union (the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM)) who believed the workers’ demands to be unattainable. As such, they 
rejected any approach for representation by the NUM, and opted instead to form an 
independent committee to present their demands to management. This rejection of NUM 
allowed the Association of Mining and Construction Union (AMCU) to emerge as a 
competitor in the industrial relations arena (Onslow, 2012). This strike action saw the 
beginnings of trade union rivalry, a factor crucial in the Marikana incident. 
The strike gained notoriety because of the acts of violence and levels of worker activism 
(Onslow, 2012). Additionally, it saw the demise of the old collective bargaining process 
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which the workers perceived to be out-dated and unable to meet their aspirations (Cawadas 
and Mitchell, 2012). Management ultimately conceded to worker demands and offered a 
22% increase in gross package which inadvertently validated workers’ actions (Bond and 
Mottiar, 2013). This agreement would catalyse wild-cat2 strike action and set a precedent for 
future wage dispute resolution (Chinguno, 2013). 
Borne of the success of the independent bargaining wage negotiations at Impala Mines, the 
workers at Lonmin saw an opportunity for their own wage negotiations due to the growing 
disillusionment with formal union representation (Cawadas and Mitchell, 2012, 
McClenaghan, 2012). Workers felt that wages were failing to meet their living costs since 
stop-order loan repayment systems (micro-credit lending facilities) (Bateman, 2012) were 
significantly reducing their take-home pay (Bond and Mottiar, 2013). Inspired by the previous 
strike action by mineworkers at the Impala Mine, workers at Lonmin (in Marikana) embarked 
on a wildcat strike on 10 August 2012 (Marinovich, 2012).  
Workers rejected attempts by NUM to mediate the conflict and followed the model of the 
Lonmin strikers whereby independent committees were created to champion the workers’ 
cause (Chinguno, 2013). Lonmin management were aware of the failure of Impala 
management to engage with the workers via the old collective bargaining approach and, 
instead, elected to respond to the workers outside of the traditional negotiation framework. 
NUM disagreed with the process, which angered workers who believed this was their pact. 
Clashes ensued between protesting workers and union officials, the first of which took place 
on 11 August 2012. Marching strikers were shot at by NUM members causing the death of 
two workers (Bond and Mottiar, 2013). This act incited workers to retaliate, further instigating 
violent confrontations and resulting in an increase in police presence in the area. By this 
stage, the share price shed over 6%  of its value by 16 August 2012 as Lonmin announced it 
                                                     
2 A strike begun by workers spontaneously or without union approval.  
(n. Dictionary.com. Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition. HarperCollins 
Publishers. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/wildcat-strike (accessed: February 13, 2014).) 
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had lost 15 000 ounces worth of platinum production due to the strike and the related 
stoppages (Reuters, 2012c). 
As a result, the SAPS were deployed to move the striking miners down from a hill where 
they had been gathering for a number of days. They positioned barbed wire fencing and fired 
teargas in an attempt to move the workers. As the workers descended from their position, 
the SAPS opened fire on the miners, killing 34 and wounding an additional 78 (Nkosi, 2012). 
The motives of the SAPS officers are unclear but it has been suggested that one of the 
workers was carrying a pistol and fired the first shots causing the SAPS to retaliate (Bond 
and Mottiar, 2013).  
Days of protest climaxed with the deaths of 34 mine workers by members of the SAPS on 16 
August 2012, sparking the reaction of local and international media (Marinovich, 2012). In 
the aftermath of the incident, the Farlam Commission of Inquiry was established to 
investigate the incident (Smith, 2013, Evans, 2013). No attempt as yet has been made to 
discipline any of the police officers accused of the killings (Bond and Mottiar, 2013). The 
Marikana event has had a profound impact on the labour landscape of South Africa and is 
suggested as being a major reason for the gaining popularity of wildcat strikes 
(McClenaghan, 2012). 
Despite increased media attention and the convening of a formal commission of enquiry, 
there has been no published academic research on the potential economic effect of the 
Marikana incident. Consequently, the purpose of this research is to consider the effect that 
the Marikana incident has had on the share price returns of mining companies listed on the 
JSE for a specified period. The detail of the application of the testing process is provided in 
Section 3. 
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3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Background 
Event-study methodology is a forward-looking approach which identifies abnormal returns 
resulting from a single event. Event studies provide an insightful approach in determining the 
significance of a particular event, measured in terms of the effect on share prices. (Kothari 
and Warner, 2006).  
Two key papers by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al (1969) are considered to be the 
origin of event study methodology. The study performed by Ball and Brown (1968) evaluated 
the response of accounting numbers to specific reports being either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ news 
whereas, the study performed by Fama et al (1969) examined the speed of the reaction of a 
stock price to new information (a stock split announcement). MacKinlay (1997), however,  
declares the study performed by Dolley (1933) on the reaction of share prices to the 
announcements of share splits, as the first recorded instance of an event-study.  
Interest in capital structure research, spearheaded by Modigliani and Miller (1958) played a 
pivotal role in bringing capital asset pricing issues to the forefront of finance research and 
promoting interest in new finance models, such as the event-study methodology (Corrado, 
2011). Event study methodology has now become the standard measure for determining 
share price reaction to announcements or events (Binder, 1998, MacKinlay, 1997). The early 
success of these studies can be largely attributed to the use of the ‘market model’ approach 
to calculating normal returns which was styled on the popularised economic Capital Asset 
Pricing Model of Sharpe (1964).  
Two major advancements in event study methodology have taken place since its inception: 
firstly, the more prominent use of daily stock returns over monthly returns due to the latter 
providing a more definite measure of abnormal returns and, secondly, the enhancement of 
the methods used to estimate abnormal returns and determine the statistical significance of 
those returns  (Kothari and Warner, 2006). 
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The event-study methodology has a number of very useful applications, notably in insider 
trading cases such as the one  performed by Mitchell and Netter (1994) who use financial 
economics to prove accused traders guilty. This study defined ‘t0’ as the date of the merger 
announcement and proved that the disturbance in the normal movement in the build-up to 
the event date was attributable to the gains trading of the investors with insider information. 
Event-study methodology can also play a crucial role in testing the efficiency of a market: 
more specifically, consistent non zero abnormal returns that continue after an event are an 
indication that the market is not behaving in an efficient manner (Kothari and Warner, 2006). 
Fama (1991) goes as far to suggest that event studies are the ‘cleanest evidence we have 
on efficiency’ (Fama, 1991. p. 1602). Of importance is the examination of the post-event 
period in determination of how efficiently the market responds to new information (Kothari 
and Warner, 2006).  
3.1.1 Past event studies 
Numerous event methodology studies focus on the effect on stock prices from 
announcements, namely: earnings announcements (Chambers and Penman, 1984), 
announcements of new equity issues (Barclay and Litzenberger, 1988), and the impact of 
bond rating agency announcements on bond prices (Hand et al, 1992). Specific to share 
price movements, Rosen (2006) identifies how the announcement of a merger (a single 
event) can trigger a short-term movement in stock price based on investor sentiment.  
Other studies focus on events not within the control of the entity, such as the event-study 
performed by Worrell and Davidson (1987), which specifically examines the impact of CEO 
succession on the wealth of shareholders following the death of their predecessors.  Chen 
and Siems (2004) used event-study methodology to assess the immediate impact that 
terrorist attacks (most notably the September 11 attack) had on United States of America’s 
(USA) capital markets.  In the South African context Bhana has conducted numerous event-
studies in terms of: announcements of management buyouts (Bhana, 2005), examining the 
event of unbundling transactions on the JSE (Bhana, 2006), and reaction to share 
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repurchase announcements  and their impacts on JSE listed firms (Bhana, 2007). The 
Marikana incident bears a resemblance to the above and, therefore, endorses the use of 
event-study methodology for testing the impact3 of the Marikana incident on mining 
companies listed on the JSE (Section 1.3). 
Past studies have indicated that the JSE has demonstrated a weak to semi-strong market 
efficiency, as discussed in Section 2.1.3 (Choudhry, 1999, Magnusson and Wydick, 2002, 
Jefferis et al, 1999, Glass and Smit, 1995) and, therefore, share prices will absorb and react 
to publicly available information (Malkiel and Fama, 1970). This means that event study 
methodology is an effective technique for dealing with the proposed research objective.  
 
  
                                                     
3 The term ‘testing the impact’ is used as the event methodology does not prove causality.  
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3.1.2 The event-method  
The aim of an event study is to examine the return reaction of a sample of firms responding 
to a specific event (Kothari and Warner, 2006). Principally, the abnormal return will be the 
difference between the observed return (𝑅𝑖𝑡) and the predicted or ‘normal’ return (𝐾𝑖𝑡), 
composed as in Kothari and Warner (2006): 
𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡  − 𝐾𝑖𝑡      (Equation 1) 
 
Normal returns should be modelled using an estimation window which is kept separate from 
the event window in order ensure that the normal return is not influenced by the fluctuations 
caused by the event (Kothari and Warner, 2006). Modelling this return can be done using 
either statistical or economic approaches (MacKinlay, 1997). Two economic approaches 
used to model normal returns are the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964, 
Lintner, 1965) and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (Ross, 1976). When selecting an event 
methodology model to apply to test data, no single method is generally accepted as superior 
(Corrado, 2011). However, economic models are used less frequently in event-study 
methodology as the benefit of enhanced accuracy of findings seldom justifies the costs of 
using a more complex model (MacKinlay, 1997). 
Therefore, MacKinlay (1997) proposes the use of simpler statistical models. Two focal 
statistical approaches recommended by MacKinlay (1997) are the Constant Mean Return 
Model and the Market Model, which were originally designed by Brown and Warner (1980). 
Brown and Warner (1985) suggest that these models yield results similar to more complex 
models due to the fact that variance of the abnormal return is not reduced by choosing a 
more sophisticated model.  
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The Constant Mean Return Model has been applied in numerous studies, notably Chen and 
Siems (2004). The abnormal return (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) is determined as the difference between the 
predicted return (𝐾𝑖𝑡) and the actual return (𝑅𝑖𝑡), demonstrated below (Brown and Warner, 
1980): 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝐾𝑖    (Equation 2) 
 
where the  expected return (𝐾𝑖) is determined as the mean return for security (𝑖) under the 
assumption that the security has constant systematic risk (Brown and Warner, 1980). 
The second model provided by Brown and Warner (1980) is the market adjusted returns 
model which assumes the expected returns will be distributed equally across securities if a 
market portfolio of shares is a combination of all securities returns. The abnormal return 
(𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡)  for a specific share (𝑖) will be the return on a share of its return (𝑅𝑖𝑡)  less the return of 
the market (𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡). The last model discussed by Brown and Warner (1980) is the market and 
risk adjusted return model or more simply the ‘Market Model’ which uses elements of the 
CAPM formula to determine the expected return.  
MacKinlay (1997) proposes the use of the Market Model approach over the Constant Mean 
Return Model since the Market Model removes abnormalities in the return, associated with 
market variations, as well as incorporating the systematic risk of the share. The model 
adjusts the event date return of the whole market against the return of a single share, 
confirmed by the following formula (Corrado, 2011, Fama et al, 1969): 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 × 𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡   (Equation 3) 
 
where 𝑅𝑡 and 𝑅𝑀𝑡 are the returns on a specified share and the return of the overall market at 
time (𝑡). This method removes the effect of the economy-wide (market) returns on the stock 
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(i) while dissecting just the return related to firm-specific information. The firm-specific return 
isolated from that of the market is 𝑒𝑡. The market model parameters of 𝑎 (‘alpha’ being the 
excess of return, relative to a specific benchmark index) and 𝑏 (‘beta’ being the measure of 
correlation in change of a specified share in relation to a designated index) are determined 
by ordinary least squares regression of firm returns 𝑅𝑡 and market 𝑅𝑀𝑡 over a defined 
estimation window (Corrado, 2011) (see Appendix A). It is assumed that these coefficients 
will remain constant during the event and estimation windows (Binder, 1998).  
Ball and Brown (1968) observe that the event itself should not form part of the estimation 
window since it will distort the measurement of the normal returns. Estimation windows vary 
depending on the preference of the analyst but windows of 250 days are typically used 
which corresponds comparatively with the trading calendar year, usually ending 6 days 
before the event date (Corrado, 2011).  
The length of the event-window has a considerable influence on the reliability of the results 
from event test (Kothari and Warner, 2006). Long-horizon methods (applied for event studies 
with larger event-windows) are much less dependable due to innate variability in long run 
abnormal returns (Brown and Warner, 1980). As such, the forecasting of these returns 
accurately over a longer period is much more difficult which naturally makes the results of 
short-horizon terms much more reliable (Kothari and Warner, 2006). This study will, 
therefore, have a short-horizon (6 days CAR) to avoid the problem of forecasting estimated 
returns over a longer window.        
3.1.3 Robustness tests 
An event-study aims to establish whether the cross sectional distribution of abnormal returns 
at the event date will be consistently different from that which was predicted (Kothari and 
Warner, 2006). In order to determine this statistical significance, it is necessary to apply test 
statistics to the data. 
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A common assumption key to formulating the tests of statistical significance is that the 
abnormal returns will be normally distributed (Corrado, 2011). Principally, this suggests that 
under the null hypothesis, the abnormal returns on the event date should have an expected 
value of zero during the event period if they are normally distributed but a return will be 
evident under a true alternative hypothesis. This is stated as follows: 
      𝐻0: 𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 0        𝐻𝐴:  𝐴𝑅𝑡 ≠ 0 
It is necessary to compare the distributions of actual abnormal returns to predicted abnormal 
returns and determining whether these distributions are similar for statistical significance 
(Kothari and Warner, 2006). This cross sectional mean abnormal return for 𝑁 securities over 
period (𝑡) is determined using the following formula (Kothari and Warner, 2006, Fama et al, 
1969):  
𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1      (Equation 4) 
Over a multi-period interval, a cumulative average residual method is used, defined as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1,𝑡2) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
   (Equation 5) 
The standard null hypothesis t-test statistic is calculated as follows (Kothari and Warner, 
2006): 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1𝑡2)
𝜎2[ (𝑡1𝑡2)]1/2
    (Equation 6) 
Where:     𝜎2 (𝑡1, 𝑡2)  =  𝐿𝜎2(𝐴𝑅𝑡) 
Once computed, the test statistic is compared to its assumed distribution under the null 
hypothesis (Kothari and Warner, 2006). The null hypothesis is rejected if the test statistic 
exceeds a critical value, below a 5% level of significance (Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 
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2010, Kothari and Warner, 2006). The t-test recommended by Kothari and Warner (2006) is 
a parametric t-test and will only function if the data is normally distributed (Corrado, 2011).  
A number of studies focus on the test statistic performance, most notably Brown and Warner 
(1985), who examine the effectiveness of test statistics on daily data. This branch of study 
questioned the reliance on assumption of normally distributed returns for the robustness 
tests and suggested alternate methods if the test data is not normally distributed – i.e. may 
be skewed (kurtosis) (Corrado, 2011). The most successful of these models are the 
nonparametric sign and rank tests (Corrado, 1989) applied in well-known studies by 
Chandra et al (1992) and more recently Corrado and Truong (2008). The reason for 
introducing more precise testing such as the nonparametric sign and rank tests was the 
concern that assumption of normality from parametric tests may be poorly specified when 
there is the concern that data is not normally distributed (Corrado, 2011). The use of these 
non-parametric tests in the context of this study is discussed in more detail in Section 3.5. 
In summary, in instances where the data is normally distributed, then standard parametric 
models are applicable but where there is non-normality in the data, then it is necessary to 
apply the nonparametric tests. Consequently, this study will first apply parametric t-tests to 
determine significance and subsequently validate the results with non-parametric t-tests.  
A second problem faced with test statistics is the issue of event-induced variance which 
would require cross sectional variance adjustments to the test data (Corrado, 2011). This is 
only an issue facing a sample where the observer intends to extrapolate the findings over a 
much larger population and not in an instance where the sample constitutes the entire 
population of interest (Corrado, 2011) which is the case in this study.  
3.2 Research design 
As referred to in Section 1.1,  Chen and Siems (2004)  use the event-study method to 
assess the impact of unforeseen terrorist events on global market indices, supporting the 
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use of the same approach in this research report (see also: White (1996), Capelle-Blancard 
and Laguna (2010), Kalra et al (1993)). 
In this report, the event-study methodology has been applied to determine the abnormality of 
returns attributable to the Marikana event by using the Market Model approach, popular in 
financial literature (MacKinlay, 1997). This approach allows for the prediction of what the 
normal returns would be expected to be should no event-induced volatility have occurred 
during the event window. The abnormality of the returns would be driven by the difference 
between what the actual returns were during the event window and what the Market Model 
predict those returns to be (adapted from Chen and Siems (2004)).  
3.2.1 Test period 
The test period is divided into two sections: the estimation window and the event window. 
The complete test period begins on 3 January 2012 (beginning of the 2012 trading year) and 
runs for 145 days (up until 31 July 2012). The estimation window ends at the end of July so 
as not to dilute the normal returns with the influence of the strike and Marikana incident that 
take place during August.  
The event window begins on 16 of August (the date of the Marikana incident), defined as 𝑡0 
and runs for a period of 5 days post the event (𝑡+5) for a total event window of 6 days 
(adapted from Chen and Siems (2004)). 
This estimation window is used to compute beta and alpha (the slope parameters) used in 
the market model to determine the expected returns during the event window. The event 
window is the time frame during which the abnormal returns are calculated. This is done 
beginning on the date of Marikana and continuing for 5 days after the event (cumulatively 6 
days). The 6 day event window applied is consistent with the event window applied in the 
Chen and Siems (2004) study. 
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3.2.2 Normal returns 
An essential component of the Market Model is the computation of the normal return. The 
Market Model employs a CAPM-type approach to determine the relationship between a 
particular share and a given index (in this instance the JSE All Share Index). The formula for 
determining the expected returns is shown below (Corrado, 2011, Fama et al, 1969) (see 
Section 3.1.2): 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 × 𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 
3.2.3 Abnormal returns 
Abnormal returns explain how the actual return deviates from the expected return. An 
abnormal return can be negative or positive, depending on the reaction of the actual return 
on the test date. Abnormal returns can arise out of two circumstances: prediction error (per 
the model used) and the event-specific driver (what is being tested). The prediction error is 
within the control of the researcher so this can be lowered by selecting an appropriate 
prediction model (such as the Market Model) (MacKinlay, 1997). 
3.2.4 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR’s) 
The CAR is a measure used to cumulate the effect of an event over the event window.  This 
measure is used in event-study methodology as a device to measure the sustained effect of 
an event by summing the difference between actual and expected returns over the event 
window (Harvey and Sticht, 2014). This is applied in the instance where a particular event 
has the ability to affect the share price for more than a single day. 
3.2.5 Volume traded 
An element that is intrinsic to the understanding of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama et 
al, 1969) is that the information delivered by the share price will be accurate and complete. 
In order for this assumption to hold true, there needs to be sufficient volume of the share 
traded on the date of the event. This thin trading problem is addressed by the application of 
the sign and rank test as suggested by financial literature (Cowan and Sergeant, 1996). 
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3.3 Population and sample 
3.3.1 Population and sample 
This study aimed to examine the potential effect of the Marikana incident on all companies 
listed on the JSE mining sector during the period 1 January 2012 to 23 August 2012 (5 days 
trading post the Marikana incident). Since this study will be examining all the firms listed on 
the JSE mining sector during this period, it is not necessary to use any additional sampling 
instructions to extract firms to test. During this observation period 54 companies were listed 
in the mining sector so the population is comprised of all of these firms.  
Small sample size would make extrapolation of results problematic. As a result of the 
robustness tests carried out below (Section 4.1), as well as the fact that the entire population 
of mining companies has been tested, provide a strong degree of comfort over the statistical 
reliability of the results. It should also be reiterated that the aim of this study is not to 
generalise results but to provide an initial account of the potential effect of the Marikana 
incident on share prices of JSE-listed mining companies4.  
3.3.2 Data collection 
Share prices and daily volume trades were obtained from the BFA McGregor database for 
the observation period for all companies in question. 
3.4 Process of hypothesis testing 
As applied in many quantitative finance studies, a null hypothesis should be stated and 
tested in order to draw conclusions about the findings of the research. Hypothesis testing 
involves setting a goal (statement) and accepting or rejecting this postulated argument, 
based on statistical results. 
                                                     
4 The results (Section 4) suggest that the Marikana incident was not widely correlated with changes in 
share prices. The isolated nature of the incident also negates the need for testing the entire 
population of JSE listed companies.  
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3.4.1 Null and Alternate hypothesis 
Under the null hypothesis, an event should have no effect on abnormal returns. Therefore, in 
mathematical notion, our null and alternative hypotheses are described as follows: 
(1) 𝐻0: 𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 0 𝐻𝐴:  𝐴𝑅𝑡 ≠ 0  
(2) 𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡+2 = 0 𝐻𝐴:  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡+2 ≠ 0  
(3) 𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡+5 = 0 𝐻𝐴:  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡+5 ≠ 0  
For the first equation (1), concerning abnormal returns, a two tailed t-test will be performed 
and the null hypothesis will be tested at 95% confidence level (5% level of significance) 
against the corresponding the critical values from the z table of 1.96 and -1.96. The null 
hypothesis will be rejected for any values not within the range of the critical values. 
The second equation (2), tests the hypothesis that there will be no CAR for the 3 day event 
window. The degrees of freedom will be 2 in this instance (𝑛 − 1) since the event window 
has now been expanded to three days. As such, the critical values from the student’s t-
distribution table for a 95% confidence level are 2.92 and -2.92. Similarly for the third 
equation (3), the degrees of freedom for the 6 day CAR have increased to 5 so the 
corresponding critical values for a 95% confidence level from the student’s t-distribution table 
are 2.015 and -2.015 respectively. The use of this confidence level is recommended by 
financial literature (Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2010, Kothari and Warner, 2006).   
Should any of the observed t-test scores fall within the assigned range of critical values 
above for any of the above equations, the null hypothesis will fail to be rejected for that 
particular test.  
It should be noted that a significance level of 5% has been selected for this test (𝛼 = 0.05). 
This is widely accepted in event study methodology literature as an appropriate level of 
confidence to be able to reject the null hypothesis and minimize the possibility of a Type I 
error (rejecting a null hypothesis that is actually true) (Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2010, 
Kothari and Warner, 2006).   
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3.5 Calculation of test statistics 
Part of determining the significance of the results is to employ robustness tests to the 
observations successfully. These t-tests need to be applied to both abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns and separate values need to be determined for both. 
Additionally, as discussed in the Section 3.1.3, we cannot assume that the data will follow 
the normal distribution assumption; therefore, two separate non-parametric t-tests must be 
performed in order to determine the validity of the data.  
To determine the significance of event date abnormal returns, the t-test used is (Patell, 
1976): 
𝑡𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 =
𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡
?̂?𝐴𝑅𝑗
   (Equation 7) 
Whereby the standard deviation: 
?̂?𝐴𝑅𝑗 = √
1
𝑀𝑖 − 𝑑𝐹
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡
2
𝐸𝑊𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑡=𝐸𝑊𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
And: 
𝐸𝑊 – represents the estimation window with 𝐸𝑊𝑚𝑎𝑥 denoting the last day of the event 
window and 𝐸𝑊𝑚𝑖𝑛 denoting the earliest day in the event window 
𝑀𝑖 – refers to the non-missing returns (i.e. matched returns in the regression) 
𝑑𝐹 - refers to the degrees of freedom applied in the market model (in this instance 144 
(𝑛 − 1)) 
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To determine the significance of cumulative abnormal returns, the t-test applied is 
(MacKinlay, 1997): 
𝑡𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2 =
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗
√𝑇?̂?𝐴𝑅𝑗
2
    (Equation 8) 
Where: 
?̂?𝐴𝑅𝑗 = √1 +
1
𝑀𝑖 − 𝑑𝐹
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡
2
𝐸𝑊𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐸𝑊𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
Both the t-tests described above are considered to be parametric t-tests, meaning that the 
principle assumption underlying the t-test is that the data will be normally distributed. Since 
this assumption will not always hold true, it is important also to apply non-parametric tests to 
the data in order to validate the results (Corrado, 2011). Two of the most successful non-
parametric tests which  can be performed in this type of study are the sign (Cowan and 
Sergeant, 1996) and rank  (Corrado, 1989, Kolari and Pynnönen, 2010) tests.  
The generalized sign test is specified as follows: 
𝑧𝐺 =
𝑤−𝑛?̂?
√𝑛?̂?(1−𝑝)
    (Equation 9) 
 
In which: 
𝑤 - number of stocks in the event window for which the cumulative abnormal return is 
positive 
𝑛 - number of firms 
𝑝- portion of firms with positive signed returns in estimation window 
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?̂? - binomial distribution of positive signs 
 
The generalized rank test is specified as follows: 
𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 = √𝑑
𝐾𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ −𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘
√∑ (𝐾𝑡
̅̅ ̅−𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘)2
151⁄
151
𝑡=1
   (Equation 10) 
In which: 
𝑑- length of estimation window 
𝐾𝐷̅̅ ̅̅  – average rank during the event window 
𝐾𝑡̅̅ ̅– average rank on each date during event and estimation window 
 
Ultimately, by analysing changes in share prices using both parametric t-tests and the non-
parametric sign and rank tests, the research can ensure the validity and reliability of the 
results.  
4 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
The results for each mining company are presented, first for the general mining sector and 
then, more specifically, for the platinum sector. Finally, a summarised table is provided for all 
observed companies experiencing abnormal returns at the 90%, 95% or the 99% confidence 
level. Results are presented in both tabular and graphical format in order to give a more 
holistic view of the information communicated.  
4.1 Results 
4.1.1 Abnormal Returns (AR’s) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR’s) 
Table 1.1 details all corporations tested, showing separately the AR’s and the CAR’s for 
each firm, calculated in accordance with the event-study methodology. The AR’s are 
calculated on the date of the Marikana incident and the CAR’s are calculated at both two-day 
and five-day intervals post the event. The table summarises the observations and, 
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additionally, provides an indication of the significance of the abnormal returns as confirmed 
by the T-tests applied, as shown by the asterisks (*) symbol. 
Table 1.1: GENERAL MINING SECTOR 
Share code Company name AR 
CAR’s 3 
Day CAR’s 6 Day 
WEZ WESIZWE PLATINUM LTD -2.997% 0.186% 12.166%* 
PAN PAN AFRICAN RESOURCES PLC 2.466%* -6.460%* -2.619% 
DRN DELRAND RESOURCES LTD -0.171% -0.880% -1.516% 
KEH KEATON ENERGY HOLDINGS LTD -1.667% -5.046% -12.268%* 
RBP ROYAL BAFOKENG PLATINUM LTD -2.236%* -4.239%* -4.976%* 
CZA COAL OF AFRICA LTD -1.220% -4.686% -10.346%* 
FSE FIRESTONE ENERGY LTD -0.615% 0.667% -12.112% 
VIL VILLAGE MAIN REEF LTD -0.188% -3.481% -0.548% 
CMO CHROMETCO LTD 0.302% -13.187% -12.321% 
EPS EASTERN PLATINUM LTD -8.076% -6.534% 3.981% 
MMH MIRANDA MINERAL HOLDINGS LTD 4.588% 5.305% -0.011% 
BDM BUILDMAX LTD -7.772% -7.575% -0.939% 
CRD CENTRAL RAND GOLD LTD 20.696%** 29.555%* 12.841% 
DMC DIAMONDCORP PLC 0.852% 1.024% 3.067% 
FSEO1 FIRESTONE ENERGY LTD 1.126% 1.039% 3.633% 
FMC FORBES AND MANHATTAN COAL CORP 0.712% 0.830% 2.527% 
HWA HWANGE COLLIERY COMPANY LTD 0.636% 0.438% 1.852% 
PZG PAMDZI GOLD LTD 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
GBG GREAT BASIN GOLD LTD -20.171%*** -19.151%* -13.007% 
JBL JUBILEE PLATINUM PLC 0.198% 2.336% -0.190% 
IRA INFRASORS HOLDINGS LTD -8.261% -13.245% -5.383% 
RDI ROCKWELL DIAMONDS INCORPORATED 0.117% 0.516% 0.923% 
BIL BHP BILLITON PLC 0.651% 2.010% 2.155% 
EXX EXXARO RESOURCES LTD -2.465% -0.632% -2.585% 
AQP AQUARIUS PLATINUM LTD 0.973% 6.242% 19.932%* 
SAH SOUTH AFRICAN COAL MINING HOLDINGS 0.909% 3.499% 1.146% 
KBO KIBO MINING PLC 0.740% 1.734% 0.374% 
UUU URANIUM ONE INC 5.151% 6.549% 6.517% 
PLL PLATFIELDS LTD -29.524% 1.469% 0.456% 
GGM GOLIATH GOLD MINING LTD -0.204% 0.318% -2.513% 
RNG RANDGOLD & EXPLORATION COMPANY LTD -0.260% -24.230%* -24.786%* 
RSG RESOURCE GENERATION LTD 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
BAU BAUBA PLATINUM LTD 0.166% -16.279% 1.657% 
WSL WESCOAL HOLDINGS LTD 1.045% -2.421% -3.659% 
TAW TAWANA RESOURCES NL -0.643% -0.880% -2.457% 
WGR 
WITWATERSRAND CONSOLIDATED GOLD 
RESOURCES -0.157% 1.011% 1.037% 
SEP SEPHAKU HOLDINGS LTD 0.753% 3.181% 1.476% 
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Table 1.1: GENERAL MINING SECTOR 
Share code Company name AR 
CAR’s 3 
Day CAR’s 6 Day 
TSX TRANS HEX GROUP LTD -1.452% 2.926% -3.515% 
DRD DRDGOLD LTD -1.144% 1.130% 1.061% 
GDO GOLD ONE INTERNATIONAL LTD -2.507% 0.169% -0.982% 
ANG ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI LTD 2.436% 2.009% 1.589% 
HAR HARMONY GOLD MINING COMPANY LTD 1.516% -10.177%* -4.116% 
GFI GOLD FIELDS LTD 1.379% 0.798% 0.599% 
IMP IMPALA PLATINUM HOLDINGS LTD -1.642% 1.351% 2.462% 
NHM NORTHAM PLATINUM LTD -2.480% -1.703% 6.324%* 
AMS ANGLO AMERICAN PLAT LTD -1.008% -1.126% 2.871% 
AGL ANGLO AMERICAN PLC 0.403% 0.876% 2.262% 
ARI AFRICAN RAINBOW MINERALS LTD 1.811% 1.379% -0.911% 
ASR ASSORE LTD -0.485% 2.971% 5.035% 
MRF MERAFE RESOURCES LTD -0.191% 0.406% 0.161% 
LON LONMIN PLC -8.402%*** -10.86%* -7.302%* 
ATL ATLATSA RESOURCES CORP -11.122% 3.128% 7.479% 
PET PETMIN LTD -0.172% -4.378% -8.850%* 
SNU SENTULA MINING LTD 0.082% 0.611% -2.008% 
 
*Significant at a 90% confidence level 
**Significant at a 95% confidence level 
***Significant at a 99% confidence level 
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Table 1.2 details only the results for the platinum corporations tested in this research report. 
The results are displayed in the same format as those for the entire mining sector with the 
asterisks (*) used to indicate the level of significance for the abnormal returns tested. 
Table 1.2: PLATINUM MINING SECTOR 
Share code Company name AR 
CAR’s 3 
Day CAR’s 6 Day 
AMS ANGLO AMERICAN PLAT LTD -1.008% -1.126% 2.871% 
AQP AQUARIUS PLATINUM LTD 0.973% 6.242% 19.932%* 
ATL ATLATSA RESOURCES CORP -11.122% 3.128% 7.479% 
BAU BAUBA PLATINUM LTD 0.166% -16.279% 1.657% 
EPS EASTERN PLATINUM LTD -8.076% -6.534% 3.981% 
IMP IMPALA PLATINUM HOLDINGS LTD -1.642% 1.351% 2.462% 
JBL JUBILEE PLATINUM PLC 0.198% 2.336% -0.190% 
LON LONMIN PLC -8.402%*** -10.856%* -7.302%* 
NHM NORTHAM PLATINUM LTD -2.480% -1.703% 6.324% 
PLL PLATFIELDS LTD -29.524% 1.469% 0.456% 
RBP ROYAL BAFOKENG PLATINUM LTD -2.236%* -4.239%* -4.976%* 
WEZ WESIZWE PLATINUM LTD -2.997% 0.186% 12.166% 
 
*Significant at a 90% confidence level 
**Significant at a 95% confidence level 
***Significant at a 99% confidence level 
 
Presented below, Table 1.3 summarises those corporations which experienced significant 
abnormal returns either on the event date (AR), for 3-day and 6-day cumulative abnormal 
returns post the event date (“CAR’s 3 Day” and “CAR’s 6 Day”). The t-test values used in the 
performance of the significance tests are shown in brackets below the abnormal return 
results. 
Table 1.3: SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT RESULTS 
Company name Mining 
sector5 
AR CAR’s 3 
Day 
CAR’s 6 
Day 
WESIZWE PLATINUM LTD Plat -2.997% 
(-0.91) 
 
0.186% 
(0.03) 
 
12.166%* 
(1.50) 
                                                      
5 Platinum mining companies are shaded blue whilst gold mining companies are shaded gold. 
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Table 1.3: SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT RESULTS 
Company name Mining 
sector5 
AR CAR’s 3 
Day 
CAR’s 6 
Day 
PAN AFRICAN RESOURCES PLC Gold 2.466%* 
(1.82) 
 
-6.460%* 
(-2.76) 
 
-2.619% 
(-0.78) 
 
KEATON ENERGY HOLDINGS LTD Coal -1.667% 
(-0.62) 
 
-5.046% 
(-1.09) 
 
-12.268%* 
(-1.85) 
 
ROYAL BAFOKENG PLATINUM LTD Plat -2.236%* 
(-1.71) 
 
-4.239%* 
(-1.87) 
 
-4.976%* 
(-1.54) 
 
COAL OF AFRICA LTD Coal -1.220% 
(-0.44) 
 
-4.686% 
(-0.97) 
 
-10.346%* 
(-1.50) 
 
CENTRAL RAND GOLD LTD Gold 20.696%** 
(2.27) 
 
29.555%* 
(1.87) 
 
12.841% 
(0.57) 
 
GREAT BASIN GOLD LTD Gold -20.171%*** 
(-4.29) 
 
-19.151%* 
(-2.35) 
 
-13.007% 
(-1.12) 
 
AQUARIUS PLATINUM LTD Plat 0.973% 
(0.27) 
 
6.242% 
(1.00) 
 
19.932%* 
(2.23) 
 
RANDGOLD & EXPLORATION COMPANY 
LTD 
Gold -0.260% 
(-0.05) 
 
-24.230%* 
(-2.67) 
 
-24.786%* 
(-1.91) 
 
HARMONY GOLD MINING COMPANY LTD Gold 1.516% 
(0.86) 
 
-10.177%* 
(-3.32) 
 
-4.116% 
(-0.94) 
 
NORTHAM PLATINUM LTD Plat -2.480% 
(-1.64) 
 
-1.703% 
(-0.65) 
 
6.324%* 
(1.69) 
 
LONMIN PLC Plat -8.402%*** 
(-5.74) 
 
-10.86%* 
(-4.28) 
 
-7.302%* 
(-2.01) 
 
PETMIN LTD Iron -0.172% 
(-0.09) 
 
-4.378% 
(-1.35) 
 
-8.850%* 
(-1.92) 
 
 
*Significant at a 90% confidence level 
**Significant at a 95% confidence level 
***Significant at a 99% confidence level 
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As shown in Table 1.3 of the Platinum Mining Companies tested, only Lonmin experienced 
abnormal returns significant at a 99% confidence level. When graphing the cumulative 
abnormal returns (Graph 1.1), it is shown that Lonmin experiences a steep share price drop 
on the date of Marikana when compared to the General and Platinum Mining Indices. It is 
evident that there is a much stricter correlation of the indexes and share price in the build-up 
to the event (16 August 2012) at which point Lonmin’s share price diverges from the 
movements of the General Mining and Platinum Index. 
 
 
 
As was indicated in Section 3.1.3, it is necessary to conduct non-parametric t-tests in order 
to validate the results of the parametric t-tests. Table 1.4 below summarises the results of 
the non-parametric sign and rank tests. An indication of the significance of the test statistic is 
shown by an asterisk (*). A detailed breakdown of the application of the test statistics is 
provided in Appendix C (Sign Test) and Appendix D (Rank test).  
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Graph 1.1: CAR's during estimation and 
event windows
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The sign test statistic below tests the significance of the signs of the population tested in 
term of the event date (AR) and the event windows for two (CAR 3) and five days post the 
event (CAR 6). The rank test is applied across the entire population for the duration of the 
event window (CAR 6); hence the test statistic is one number.  
Table 1.4: A summary of the sign and rank test statistics 
  AR CAR 3 CAR 6 
Sign -1.05742 0.658914 -0.48531 
Rank -0.875769667 
 
The results depicted in Table 1.4 indicate that the results were not significant when applied 
to the entire population of companies listed on the JSE mining sector.   
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4.1.2 Volume of shares traded 
The volume of daily share trades serves as an indicator for the level of active trading 
(responsiveness) and can provide insight into the quality of information transferred by share 
price changes (Blume et al, 1994). Presented below in Table 2.1 is the volume of trades of 
those shares that experienced significant abnormal returns as depicted in Table 1.3 at the 
90% confidence level or above. The table shows an average volume of shares traded per 
day over the event window (145 days). In the neighbouring column, the volume of shares 
traded on the date of the Marikana event (16th of August 2012) is provided. The final column 
shows the event date volume of shares traded as a percentage of the average shares traded 
during the estimation window.  
Table 2.1: Event volumes of shares traded   
Company Name 
Mining 
sector 
Average shares 
traded during 
estimation window 
(A) 
Event Date (B) B/A 
WESIZWE PLATINUM LTD 
Plat 
                664 173          613 045  92% 
PAN AFRICAN RESOURCES PLC 
Gold 
             2 311 713          870 972  38% 
KEATON ENERGY HOLDINGS LTD 
Coal 
                 74 095              6 870  9% 
ROYAL BAFOKENG PLATINUM LTD 
Plat 
                 88 155              3 279  4% 
COAL OF AFRICA LTD 
Coal 
                688 332            67 208  10% 
CENTRAL RAND GOLD LTD 
Gold 
                350 088              1 000  0% 
GREAT BASIN GOLD LTD 
Gold 
                 68 831          505 476  734% 
AQUARIUS PLATINUM LTD 
Plat 
                840 481          249 322  30% 
RANDGOLD & EXPLORATION 
COMPANY LTD 
Gold 
                   9 906                   0   0% 
HARMONY GOLD MINING COMPANY 
LTD 
Gold 
             1 451 072          634 351  44% 
NORTHAM PLATINUM LTD 
Plat 
                978 508          867 466  89% 
LONMIN PLC 
Plat 
                795 811        2 011 243  253% 
PETMIN LTD 
Iron 
                568 745          314 746  55% 
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5 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
This report aimed to identify the potential effect that the Marikana incident had on companies 
listed in the mining sector on the JSE, using the event study methodology. The approach 
used to obtain the results was the same as that applied in the study performed by Chen and 
Siems (2004) who measured the impact of terrorist attacks (unforeseen events) on global 
market indices. The results of this study indicate that the Marikana incident had an isolated 
effect on companies listed in the general mining index, specifically having a substantial 
impact on the Lonmin share price. Due to the adverse nature of the event, negative 
abnormal returns were observed, indicating that the event had a destructive effect on the 
share price.    
5.1 Abnormal returns 
The analysis of the abnormal returns observed on the event date serves as a particularly 
important part of this research report. The Marikana event took place at a specific point in 
time (16 August 2012). Therefore, the effect of the event on share prices needs to be studied 
starting on this date.  
Abnormal returns on the event date are shown in tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3. It is clear that the 
share price of Lonmin experiences abnormal returns on this date at a 99% confidence level. 
The level of abnormal return is strongly negative for this particular share with an 8.42% 
abnormal return observed for Lonmin on the day or Marikana. The actual movement in share 
price from 15 to 16 August was R90.33 to R83.70 (a 7.34% decline in value) (BFA McGregor 
Database). 
Unexpectedly, an additional company - Great Basin Gold Ltd - also experienced abnormal 
returns significant at the 1% level (Table 1.3). Since this company has no obvious ties to the 
Marikana incident, it required additional research to determine the source of the abnormality 
of the returns. As per media publications, it emerged that the company was in emergency 
talks with lenders in order to avoid insolvency (Reuters, 2012a). The share price fell as the 
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market absorbed the news and plummeted 42,16% from the previous day’s closing price 
(from R4,15 to R2,40) (BFA McGregor Database). 
The workings for the rank tests (see Appendix C) suggest that the abnormality of returns 
experienced on the event date for both Lonmin and Great Basin Gold Ltd are the most 
significant abnormal returns of all those tested (both attained rankings of ‘1’ - implying the 
highest abnormality of all observations). This provides supporting evidence for the 
parametric t-test results of the returns testing significant at a 1% level. 
Positive abnormal returns significant at a 95% confidence level were also experienced by 
Central Rand Gold Ltd. which would not have been predicted given the adverse nature of the 
Marikana incident (Table 1.3). Further exploration of media publications of the reasons for 
this steep increase in share price might be attributed to favourable analyst reports published 
on 15 August 2012, citing better than expected results (Stanley, 2012). Owing to the 
announcement of this positive information, as well as the fact that the company is not 
engaged in platinum mining near Marikana, the share price of the Central Rand Gold Ltd 
unexpectedly rose. Given that the Marikana incident would broadly have a negative 
influence; it would be unreasonable to assume that this value change had any relationship to 
the event.  
The sign and rank t-tests (Table 1.4) (Appendix C and D) were applied to the entire 
population of mining companies on the event date to confirm the above findings. Neither the 
sign nor rank test statistics are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, implying that the 
mining sector as a whole did not treat this event as significant.  
Based on the results of the initial t-tests based on a 99% confidence level (complemented by 
the non-parametric testing) the effect of the Marikana event appears to be limited solely to 
Lonmin on the event date. Some other companies experience significant abnormal returns 
but only at the 90% confidence level which is generally considered in finance literature to be 
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insufficient evidence to suggest adverse share behaviour (Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 
2010, Kothari and Warner, 2006). 
5.2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR’s) formed an integral part of this research report due to 
the fact that they are able to highlight the sustained effect of the event. This study applied 
two CAR windows being both 3 and 6 days (as applied in the Chen and Siems (2004) study).  
The tests of the CAR’s for levels of significance only showed that results were significant at 
the 10% level of significance (Table 1.3). As previously stated, a 10% level of significance is 
inadequate to claim that results were sufficiently abnormal (Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 
2010, Kothari and Warner, 2006). These parametric t-tests results are confirmed by the 
observations of the results of the sign and rank tests as depicted in Table 1.5 (see Appendix 
C and D for workings). The test scores do not show a significant sustained impact on the 
CAR’s at either the 1%, 5% or 10% level of significance. 
As such, these results suggest that the event had a sudden and immediate impact, rather 
than a sustained impact, on the affected companies’ share prices. As discussed in Section 
5.1, only Lonmin was significantly affected. When considering this lack of persistent effect on 
the Lonmin share price, it is important to understand the containment measures which the 
company implemented in order to limit initial losses. In particular, an announcement by 
Lonmin’s management on 20 August 2012 (4 days post the event) of a rights issue would 
have contributed to a recovery of the share price (Reuters, 2012b). Although the exact 
amount of the recovery caused by the rights announcement was not determinable from the 
event method applied, a general recovery of the CAR from the original event date to the 6-
day CAR (AR: -8,402%, CAR 3 day: -10.86%, CAR 6 day -7.302%) was noted. Once again, 
this confirms that the Marikana incident was isolated and influenced only those companies 
with direct interests in the Marikana event (Lonmin). Additionally, the fact the CAR for both 
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the 3-day and 6-day post event windows were not significant at the 95% level suggests that 
the effect of Marikana on Lonmin was immediate but not prolonged.  
5.3 Volume of shares traded 
The company experiencing the greatest deviation from its average share trades is Great 
Basin Gold Ltd. where the event date volume traded was 734% of the average volume 
traded during the estimation window (see Table 2.1). As stated in the previous results 
section (section 5.2), this particular firm announced a liquidity crisis during the period under 
review (Reuters, 2012a). As discussed (section 5.2), the source of this volume increase 
would be driven by the news of this event, rather than triggered by the Marikana incident. 
Lonmin experienced the second highest volume trade volatility where the event date volume 
traded was 253% of the average volume of the trades over the estimation window (see 
Table 2.1). Perhaps more important is the absolute increase in the volume of trades on the 
event date (2 011 243 compared to the average of 795 811) (BFA McGregor Database).  
5.4 Additional discussion on the impact of Lonmin 
 It is evident that the Marikana incident had an isolated but unmistakably profound effect on 
the Lonmin share price. The reasons for no escalation effect on the rest of the mining sector 
are not apparent from the data gathered but analysis can be provided for why the incident 
could have had such a dramatic effect on the Lonmin share price. 
More recently, studies have been conducted examining the impact that corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) can have on both firm value (Gregory et al, 2013) and stock 
performance (Flammer, 2013, Chen et al, 2014). The study by Gregory et al (2013) finds that 
firms with positive social governance practices generally have better longer-term growth 
prospects, coupled with slightly lower costs of equity. Similarly, the study by Flammer (2013) 
examines the reaction of firm share prices to environmental announcements and finds that 
environmentally responsible companies  experience a significant share price increase 
whereas the opposite is true for those reporting negative environmental news. Additionally 
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Flammer (2013) determines that there has been increased external pressure on firms to 
behave responsibly towards the environment. The findings suggest that news of poor 
environmental practices will often correspond to a significant decrease in share price for the 
affected firm. 
This information is especially relevant for a possible explanation of the reaction of the market 
to the announcement of the Marikana incident. CSR is not a new issue in South African 
mining and efforts were made by the industry to take a more active role in mining 
communities (Hamann, 2004) although notable gaps still existed between CSR and 
accountability and fairness (Hamann and Kapelus, 2004). It can, however, be argued that 
the poor social responsibility of Lonmin was one of the major factors contributing to the 
Marikana incident. Investors, seeing that the firm was unable to manage its work force in a 
perceived ethical manner (i.e. by not satisfying employee demands), penalised the share 
price on the event date.  
A possible explanation of why the Marikana incident did not adversely affect only mining 
companies is that the South African mining sector had been plagued by industrial unrest 
during the 2012 year (McClenaghan, 2012). The result is that labour unrest had already 
been taken into account when pricing equity instruments of the South African mining 
organisations. It was only the unusually violent nature of this example of worker 
demonstrations which is being taken into account by the market. This also sheds light on 
why the CAR’s (post the event) are only significant at the 10% level (Table 1.3). The 
Marikana incident is seen as an unusual event, similar to the attacks on the USA during 
2011 (Chen and Siems, 2004) and does not, therefore, have a prolonged effect. By the 
same token, when Lonmin reacted to the incident to reassure stakeholders, the effect was a 
partial recovery of the share price.  
An alternative, and more optimistic assessment, is that, paradoxically, Marikana is a vote of 
confidence for the South African Mining Industry. If the South African market is at least semi-
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strong form efficient (Choudhry, 1999, Magnusson and Wydick, 2002, Jefferis et al, 1999, 
Glass and Smit, 1995), had poor labour relations (and social responsibility practices) been 
widespread, the market would have reacted by discounting the price of all shares in the 
platinum sector. The same logic applies to other mining companies not directly involved in 
Marikana. In this way, that Marikana does not appear to have characterised the relationship 
between the mining houses and labour in the long-term suggests that the efforts at good 
corporate governance in South Africa’s mining industry are having a positive effect.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
This research is among the first to examine the relationship between the Marikana incident 
and changes in the returns of South African listed mining companies. In doing so, it adds to 
the current debate on the Marikana incident which, to date, has been confined to the popular 
press. 
This report took the entire population of mining companies listed on the JSE mining index 
during the observation period and tested the impact of the Marikana incident on those 
particular companies’ share prices. The event study methodology, popular in financial 
literature, was then applied to determine the extent of abnormal returns observed during the 
event window. Parametric and non-parametric tests were applied to the abnormal returns 
and cumulative abnormal returns in order to determine the significance of the abnormality 
observed. This approached has proven successful in prior studies similar in nature to this 
research. 
The results of the study were informative. Significant abnormal returns were observed only 
for the Lonmin share price and no escalation effects were apparent. Two companies 
experienced strongly abnormal returns on the event date, namely Lonmin and Great Basin 
Gold Ltd.  The abnormal returns on the event date for these two firms tested significant at a 
1% level. It was unclear what relationship Great Basin Gold Ltd had to the Marikana incident. 
Therefore, a complementary review of the financial press was carried out to determine the 
nature of the possible connection. The investigation revealed that news was published on 
the event date concerning liquidity problems at the firm which were more likely than not the 
primary driver of the downward movement of the share price. 
Great Basin Gold Ltd aside, Lonmin was the only company to experience significant (at the 
1% level) abnormal returns on this event date. Suggested reasoning for this contained effect 
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would provide that the market specifically identified and discounted Lonmin for the poor CSR 
which contributed to the industrial unrest6. 
What is curious is how rapidly investor confidence was restored in the Lonmin share price 
after the initial shock. This is observed in the results of the 3-day and 6-day CAR which show 
less significant abnormality than the event date abnormal return. One of the inherent 
limitations of the event method is that it does not prove causality between the Marikana 
incident and changes in share prices. It also lacks the exploratory potential of qualitative 
methods needed to provide a comprehensive review of this unexpected result. Nevertheless, 
a reasonable explanation is that industrial unrest is not new to South African mining sector. 
What the market is reacting to is not the strike itself, but the unusually violent nature of the 
Marikana incident. In this context, that the effect of this incident on share returns is not 
widespread and sustained can be interpreted positively suggesting that, on the whole, the 
South African mining sector continues to be regarded as a socially responsible and 
economically viable investment choice. 
6.1 Recommendations and suggestions for further research 
The results of this research provide some valuable insights into the potential effect that such 
events can have on their related market indices. Shareholders and management can use 
these results as a potential indicator of share price reaction to apathy towards CSR. 
Companies which do not have good social responsibility practises can use this research as a 
base for sensitivity analysis should they wish to forecast the potential negative 
consequences these events may have on the share prices. The findings should also be of 
interest to a broader group of stakeholders, including members of the on-going Commission 
of Enquiry, wanting to understand better the ramifications of unrest at Marikana.  
The results also raise possibilities for future research. One of the avenues of research can 
be to explore the reasons for the recovery of the share price of Lonmin so quickly after the 
                                                     
6 It must be noted that Lonmin’s direct involvement in the killings is not proven. This research does not 
make any allegations of wrong-doing.  
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event. Section 5.4 offers some possible explanations but these need to be tested in more 
detail. For example, how the market has reacted to previous instances of industrial unrest in 
the platinum sector can be contrasted to the reaction to Marikana in an effort to understand 
how the country’s labour dynamics impact on share prices.  
The event study methodology has provided some insights but needs to be refined to provide 
more rigorous results.  The methodology itself is constantly evolving with many aspects that 
can still be improved. The estimation of the normalized returns, for example, is based on the 
CAPM model of modelling returns against those of the market. This model is not without 
limitations (Kürschner, 2008). A key requirement for the successful implementation of event 
study methodology is the assumption of an efficient market. As the JSE attracts further 
investment so the efficiency of the market may improve. As the JSE currently operates at a 
semi-strong level of market efficiency (Choudhry, 1999, Magnusson and Wydick, 2002, 
Jefferis et al, 1999, Glass and Smit, 1995), any efficiency improvements in the near future 
may require a re-assessment as to whether this level of efficiency is still considered to be 
appropriate. Future research could also concentrate on using alternate techniques, such as 
a modified Ohlson Model, to study the value relevance of the Marikana incident and similar 
events. In addition, as discussed in Section 1.4, the event method is unable to test for causal 
relationships and only considers the effect of a single event on share prices. More detailed 
econometric models, including multiple factors which could have influenced the share price 
of South African mining companies over the event period, could provide more detailed 
results. In doing so, alternate perspectives on the isolated impact of Marikana on share 
prices of the JSE mining sector could emerge.  
This study has also focused on the localized effect of the Marikana incident, concentrating 
only on the impact of the event on those companies listed on the JSE mining sector. The 
event, however, could have had much broader economic implications for the country, 
particularly concerning foreign investment. It is very possible that the Marikana incident 
could have triggered some form of capital flight from South Africa as foreign investors may 
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have chosen to divest from mining operations as a consequence. Past studies have 
examined the relationship between political instability in a country and capital flight (Fatehi 
and Gupta, 1992, Fatehi, 1994, Lensink et al, 2000) with mixed results (Chang et al, 1997, 
Deppler and Williamson, 1987).  Opportunities for further research could, therefore, explore 
changes in foreign currency movements in the aftermath of Marikana again using 
econometric-models. 
Lastly, this study aimed to assess the effect on share prices only. To enhance the economic 
literature on the Marikana event it may be informative to explore the relationship between the 
platinum price and the Marikana incident. Since the platinum price is driven by a multitude of 
factors, this assessment would require a much more detailed econometric evaluation to 
determine the extent to which the event may have affected the commodity price. 
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8 APPENDICIES 
8.1 Appendix A - Timeline of observation period 
Observational period time line (MacKinlay, 1997) 
[T0;T1] - The estimation period used to determine average normal returns. It is important 
that the estimation period and the event window do not overlap so that the event window 
returns will not influence the estimate of the average normal returns. The estimation window 
begins on 3 January 2012 (𝑇0) and runs until 31 of July 2012 (𝑇1), a total of 145 returns. This 
window only includes days that the shares actually trade.  
[t=0] – The event date. The event is indicated at t=0 (16 August 2012), the date on which the 
Marikana event takes place. This single defined date avoids the problem of ‘clustering’ 
whereby the event date differs for the each of the observed firms (MacKinlay, 1997). 
[t0; 𝑡+5] – A post-event window is included in the estimation of the average normal returns to 
increase the robustness of the average normal return measure. This event window begins 
on the date of Marikana (16 August 2012 - 𝑡0) and runs for an additional 5 trading days until 
23 August 2012 (𝑡+5) for a total of 6 days. 
 
  
T0 
 
T1 
 
𝑡+5 
 
Event: t=0 
 
Estimation Window 
 
Event Window 
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8.2 Appendix B – List of abbreviations 
 AMCU – Association of Mining and Construction Union 
 CAPM – Capital Asset Pricing Model 
 CAR – Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 CSR - Corporate Social Responsibility 
 DOS – Denial of Service 
 EMH – Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
 JSE – Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
 NUM – National Union of Mineworkers 
 RDO’s - Rock Drill Operators 
 SAPS – South African Police Service 
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8.3 Appendix C - Sign t-test workings 
Company Name  ?̂? AR CAR 3 CAR 6 
WESIZWE PLATINUM LTD 
0.57931 - + + 
PAN AFRICAN RESOURCES PLC 
0.468966 + - - 
DELRAND RESOURCES LTD 
0.055172 - - - 
KEATON ENERGY HOLDINGS LTD 
0.627586 - - - 
ROYAL BAFOKENG PLATINUM LTD 
0.482759 - - - 
COAL OF AFRICA LTD 
0.544828 - - - 
FIRESTONE ENERGY LTD 
0.468966 - + - 
VILLAGE MAIN REEF LTD 
0.510345 - - - 
CHROMETCO LTD 
0.772414 + - - 
EASTERN PLATINUM LTD 
0.482759 - - + 
MIRANDA MINERAL HOLDINGS LTD 
0.510345 + + - 
BUILDMAX LTD 
0.4 - - - 
CENTRAL RAND GOLD LTD 
0.593103 + + + 
DIAMONDCORP PLC 
0.717241 + + + 
FIRESTONE ENERGY LTD 
0.696552 + + + 
FORBES AND MANHATTAN COAL 
CORPORATION 
0.717241 + + + 
HWANGE COLLIERY COMPANY LTD 
0.641379 + + + 
GREAT BASIN GOLD LTD 
0.496552 - - - 
JUBILEE PLATINUM PLC 
0.517241 + + - 
INFRASORS HOLDINGS LTD 
0.503448 - - - 
ROCKWELL DIAMONDS 
INCORPORATED 
0.931034 + + + 
BHP BILLITON PLC 
0.475862 + + + 
EXXARO RESOURCES LTD 
0.510345 - - - 
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Company Name  ?̂? AR CAR 3 CAR 6 
AQUARIUS PLATINUM LTD 
0.572414 + + + 
URANIUM ONE INC 
0.475862 + + + 
PLATFIELDS LTD 
0.531034 - + + 
GOLIATH GOLD MINING LTD 
0.475862 - + - 
RANDGOLD & EXPLORATION 
COMPANY LTD 
0.365517 - - - 
BAUBA PLATINUM LTD 
0.77931 + - + 
WESCOAL HOLDINGS LTD 
0.42069 + - - 
TAWANA RESOURCES NL 
0.262069 - - - 
WITWATERSRAND CONSOLIDATED 
GOLD RESOURCES 
0.593103 - + + 
SEPHAKU HOLDINGS LTD 
0.455172 + + + 
TRANS HEX GROUP LTD 
0.482759 - + - 
DRDGOLD LTD 
0.524138 - + + 
GOLD ONE INTERNATIONAL LTD 
0.6 - + - 
ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI LTD 
0.489655 + + + 
HARMONY GOLD MINING 
COMPANY LTD 
0.475862 + - - 
GOLD FIELDS LTD 
0.468966 + + + 
IMPALA PLATINUM HOLDINGS LTD 
0.489655 - + + 
NORTHAM PLATINUM LTD 
0.537931 - - + 
ANGLO AMERICAN PLAT LTD 
0.489655 - - + 
ANGLO AMERICAN PLC 
0.510345 + + + 
AFRICAN RAINBOW MINERALS LTD 
0.489655 + + - 
ASSORE LTD 
0.503448 - + + 
MERAFE RESOURCES LTD 
0.489655 - + + 
LONMIN PLC 
0.489655 - - - 
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Company Name  ?̂? AR CAR 3 CAR 6 
PETMIN LTD 
0.475862 - - - 
SENTULA MINING LTD 
0.544828 + + - 
w 22 28 24 
𝒏?̂? 0.524419 
 Generalized sign test statistic -1.057419484 0.658914 -0.48531 
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8.4 Appendix D - Rank t-test workings 
  2012/08/16 2012/08/17 2012/08/20 2012/08/21 2012/08/22 2012/08/23 
WESIZWE 
PLATINUM LTD 23 138 40 126 127 149 
PAN AFRICAN 
RESOURCES PLC 145 1 4 129 149 59 
DELRAND 
RESOURCES LTD 108 41 53 134 143 9 
KEATON ENERGY 
HOLDINGS LTD 28 125 9 61 26 6 
ROYAL BAFOKENG 
PLATINUM LTD 11 62 12 17 103 95 
COAL OF AFRICA 
LTD 45 73 15 30 66 19 
FIRESTONE ENERGY 
LTD 60 32 128 45 103 24 
VILLAGE MAIN REEF 
LTD 70 76 14 145 53 32 
CHROMETCO LTD 103 57 7 122 54 106 
EASTERN 
PLATINUM LTD 4 121 54 130 27 147 
MIRANDA MINERAL 
HOLDINGS LTD 134 98 87 41 101 15 
BUILDMAX LTD 6 145 13 38 150 17 
CENTRAL RAND 
GOLD LTD 148 61 126 109 3 95 
DIAMONDCORP PLC 109 41 56 136 39 112 
FIRESTONE ENERGY 
LTD 109 42 56 135 39 111 
FORBES AND 
MANHATTAN COAL 
CORPORATION 110 41 56 136 38 114 
HWANGE COLLIERY 
COMPANY LTD 108 44 56 132 41 110 
GREAT BASIN GOLD 
LTD 1 17 137 87 138 66 
JUBILEE PLATINUM 
PLC 77 87 113 3 125 112 
INFRASORS 
HOLDINGS LTD 10 25 49 41 147 57 
ROCKWELL 
DIAMONDS 
INCORPORATED 47 114 99 21 117 44 
BHP BILLITON PLC 116 146 68 49 89 102 
EXXARO 
RESOURCES LTD 7 145 51 107 73 5 
AQUARIUS 
PLATINUM LTD 86 148 43 149 61 146 
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  2012/08/16 2012/08/17 2012/08/20 2012/08/21 2012/08/22 2012/08/23 
URANIUM ONE INC 141 129 41 19 139 46 
PLATFIELDS LTD 7 94 146 41 95 57 
GOLIATH GOLD 
MINING LTD 55 105 98 34 108 14 
RANDGOLD & 
EXPLORATION 
COMPANY LTD 55 107 1 39 109 52 
BAUBA PLATINUM 
LTD 55 3 95 148 27 128 
WESCOAL 
HOLDINGS LTD 96 36 56 99 54 58 
TAWANA 
RESOURCES NL 44 110 96 16 113 40 
WITWATERSRAND 
CONSOLIDATED 
GOLD RESOURCES 53 108 97 28 109 50 
SEPHAKU 
HOLDINGS LTD 94 105 95 37 108 54 
TRANS HEX GROUP 
LTD 47 138 62 79 121 2 
DRDGOLD LTD 44 137 55 42 77 109 
GOLD ONE 
INTERNATIONAL 
LTD 16 142 42 31 110 40 
ANGLOGOLD 
ASHANTI LTD 139 136 14 130 46 39 
HARMONY GOLD 
MINING COMPANY 
LTD 121 2 1 148 114 107 
GOLD FIELDS LTD 126 123 17 38 82 110 
IMPALA PLATINUM 
HOLDINGS LTD 17 138 124 112 96 57 
NORTHAM 
PLATINUM LTD 8 97 90 56 144 151 
ANGLO AMERICAN 
PLAT LTD 30 12 139 127 104 141 
ANGLO AMERICAN 
PLC 101 61 117 130 8 148 
AFRICAN RAINBOW 
MINERALS LTD 142 73 62 47 29 46 
ASSORE LTD 53 99 145 27 105 143 
MERAFE 
RESOURCES LTD 66 94 87 26 44 138 
LONMIN PLC 1 106 4 133 10 150 
PETMIN LTD 70 49 7 36 16 40 
SENTULA MINING 
LTD 87 121 36 12 34 128 
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  2012/08/16 2012/08/17 2012/08/20 2012/08/21 2012/08/22 2012/08/23 
Average rank 
68.02 85.81 62.71 76.69 81.91 77.55 
Population mean 
rank 76 
d 151 
Generalized Rank 
Test statistic 
-0.875769667 
 
